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The main argument of my book, which we are discussing in this symposium, is
that international institutions are not only diplomatic fora, lawmakers or financiers,
but also act and govern through information, knowledge and expertise. Their
informational activities are governed by a body of law that strikes an uneasy balance
between international cooperation, state sovereignty and individual rights. This
balance is becoming all the more salient in times of a global pandemic, when
unreliable statistics, provisional knowledge, conflicting expertise and the geopolitics
of information become the basis for drastic emergency measures across the globe.
In this post, I thus want to use the Covid-19 pandemic as a lens to reflect on current
legal problems of global information governance and to respond to the earlier
contributions by Hendrik Simon and Matthias Rossi.
Pandemics as problem of global information governance
As the time we spend looking at exponential graphs is growing exponentially, it is
important to understand that pandemics like Covid-19 also represent a problem of
global governance of information and expertise. Drastic restrictions of public life are
based on health statistics – infection curves, death rates, mortality demographics
– and weighed against their collateral damage, measured in figures of economic
growth, unemployment, domestic violence, rights restrictions etc. Such statistics
suggest scientific precision and certainty, but behind the numbers lurk significant
problems of reliability, validity, comparability and uncertainty. Some of these
difficulties are inherent in any statistical and scientific exercise (see e.g. here). Yet
our knowledge about the pandemic is also afflicted by problems of global politics,
power and cooperation.
These problems only begin with the political manipulation of health statistics. Among
rising doubts over Chinese official figures, the US now deploys the CIA to hunt
for actual virus totals. While authoritarian governments can supress unflattering
information more easily, democratic regimes have not been immune from official
mis-messagingand media misinformation. And as scientists mount a global scramble
for medical responses, international cooperation seems inhibited by competition
for vaccines and treatments, by political attempts to control the public perception
of the outbreak, and by competing narrative frames about the role of globalization,
capitalism and the state in pandemics.
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Managing these challenges seems a tall order for international institutions and their
law at a time when governments not only prioritize national interest, but openly
struggle to control the WHO’s pandemic communication. The WHO is accused to
be China’s “Coronavirus accomplice”, and US president Trump threatens to defund
the organization for contradicting his travel ban. Yet far from becoming irrelevant,
the WHO is turning out to be a key battlefield in the geopolitical struggle over global
information control. I would thus argue that the WHO is more important than ever –
and so is its law.
The role of international institutions and their law 
In my book, I developed and exemplified the legal framework for global information
governance in a specific area, the law of development finance. As Matthias Rossi
points out in his review, it is always tricky to develop generalizable claims by using
one area of reference. While development and global health differ in some respects,
these differences make my core argument even more relevant: As Armin von
Bogdandy and Pedro Villareal point out, the WHO relies even more on governance
by information, and its law addresses informational activities in even greater detail
than other international institutions. I would add that while specific rules may differ,
the analytical framework and general principles of the international institutional of
information are just as applicable to WHO law. As Matthias Rossi has summarized
the general principles in his contribution, I will focus here on their application to
the WHO’s current pandemic response. In this regard, the main legal problem is
how to reconcile tensions between the three general principles and their underlying
paradigms: informational cooperation and its functionalist emphasis on expertise;
collective self-determination and the sovereigntist force of politics; and individual
autonomy and the constitutionalist impetus of human rights.
Informational cooperation and the place of expertise
The principle of informational cooperation obliges member states to exchange
information and empowers international institutions to autonomous informational
action based on independent expertise. The WHO’s constitution and secondary law,
the 2005 International Health Regulations (IHR), establish a range of obligations
and powers that address information problems in a global pandemic. The WHO
thus fulfils unspectacular but important coordinating functions with respect to virus
and vaccine research. States are not only required to notify the WHO within 24
hours of “all events that might constitute a public health emergency of international
concern” (Art. 2 IHR), but the WHO is also empowered to collect its own information
to verify and complement state reporting (Art. 9-10 IHR). The WHO has already used
internet data during the 2003 SARS outbreak, and today google search data can
diagnose and predictinfections even before patients, let alone governments, know
about them. Based on the available information, the WHO Director General can
declare a “public health emergency of international concern” (Art. 12 IHR) and make
influential public recommendations for national measures, including the far-reaching
lockdowns most countries have currently adopted (Art. 15, 18ff).
The rules and procedures that govern the exercise of these powers heavily
emphasize the WHO’s internal technical expertise. Yet, time and again the WHO
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is criticized for being “politicized” and for making decisions not exclusively based
on expertise (cf. here, p. 4). In the current pandemic, the WHO is accused of
kowtowing to China’s political influence, taking Beijing’s official statistics at face
value, broadcasting its propaganda and uncritically recommending its epidemic
control policy to the world while neglecting its negative externalities and less
intrusive, equally effective strategies in Taiwan and elsewhere.
Collective self-determination and the place of politics
The politics of expertise is normatively addressed by the general principle of
collective informational self-determination. It is derived from the principles of
sovereignty and non-intervention and gives states a say in the production of
international knowledge that affects them. This does not mean that national
governments legally control specific information as China is trying to do. But it
acknowledges the sociological insight that knowledge production always depends
to some extent on institutional and political contexts, as Hendrik Simon stresses
out in his contribution. Politicization as such is ambivalent and may either harm or
help the legitimacy of global governance, and law cannot and should not depoliticize
global information governance entirely. Hence, the question is rather what kind of
politicization is normatively adequate, and how WHO law should be interpreted and
developed to productively couple expertise and politics.
This requires, firstly, adequate procedures and divisions of competences that
structure the interplay between the WHO’s expert bureaucracy and its political
organs. The expert bureaucracy is best placed to collect impartial and comparable
health data as a global public good. Political organs must enact a legal framework
that legitimates the exercise of international public authority, especially in the form
of emergency declarations and recommendations. The current framework does
empower the Director General to exercise this authority, but it relies too much on
the internal expertise of the WHO and cares too little about transparency, public
reason-giving, participation and diversity of experts (see here, p. 14). A more open
approach that emphasizing the pluralism and contestability of expertise would not
only represent more state-of-the-art knowledge management, but also enhance
political legitimacy.
The second point is a realist one: Acknowledging the role of states recognizes
that global powers have always attempted to use the WHO to globalize their vision
of health policy. China is no different in its attempt to become a global health
superpower. The WHO is walking a tightrope here between impartially fulfilling its
mandate and keeping Beijing committed to rules-based multilateralism. As China
is evolving from norm-taker to norm-shaper in the global legal order, the diplomatic
challenge is thus to prevent Chinese unilateralism all while defending a democratic
politics of expertise and human rights.
Human rights and the place of the individual
Human rights also impose legal requirements for the informational activities of states
and international institutions alike (cf. Art. 3, 32 IHR). The WHO must respect privacy
rights when it collects personal data, and it must guarantee access information rights
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that empower individuals and decentralize informational control. More importantly,
its public recommendations and communications must consider all human rights
affected by the pandemic: not only the duty to protect the rights to life and health
against Covid-19, but also the many rights restricted by the pandemic response,
including the rights to freedom of movement, personal liberty, assembly, association,
religion, education, privacy etc.
This is a complex balancing exercise, and the WHO can hardly recommend a
uniform balance for all member states irrespective of context. Empirically, there is
much uncertainty about the virus, and experts disagree on the relative effectiveness
of specific measures like school closures. Normatively, there are difficult trade-offs:
Lockdown measures benefit one vulnerable group, namely the elderly and those with
prior conditions, and disparately burden others – people in extreme poverty, children
barred from school, women suffering from domestic violence etc. What the WHO
can do in these circumstances is to provide empirical substance to proportionality
assessments and make distributive effects visible with the help of disaggregated
data from human rights indicators. The ideal modality for concrete balancing advice
is not one-size-fits-all recommendations but country-specific technical assistance –
but that would require more WHO funding and capacity.
The way forward
Going forward, the role for legal scholarship remains to critically compare and
develop the law of information governance across international regimes. Does the
WHO achieve a better balance between legal principles than the World Bank’s Doing
Business regime? Might it learn something from the International Panel on Climate
Change? Besides, moments of crisis can also become windows of opportunity for
structural change. Why not make the WHO the global trustee holding the patent for
the coming Covid-19 vaccine? With adequate legal safeguards, this might ensure
equal access for all at reasonable prices while making the WHO more financially
independent and less vulnerable to authoritarian regimes, populist nationalism and
regulatory capture.
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